Towards a reflexive turn in the governance of global environmental expertise the cases of the IPCC and the IPBES by Beck, Silke et al.
1 It is worth noting that there is a new global body for expert knowledge being
formed to serve the UN Convention on Combating Drought and Desertification 
and also a new scientific advisory body, the UN Scientific Advisory Board(SAB),
created by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in January 2014 (SAB 2014).
This shows that the questions we raise have a wider significance beyond the
IPCC and IPBES.
2 www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5
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The role and design of global expert organizations 
such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) or the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) needs rethinking.
Acknowledging that a one-size-fits-all model 
does not exist, we suggest a reflexive turn that 
implies treating the governance of expertise as 
a matter of political contestation.
Towards a Reflexive Turn in the Governance of
Global Environmental Expertise
The Cases of the IPCC and the IPBES
hen international organizations are compelled to respond
to ever more complex problems such as global warming and
the loss of biodiversity, knowledge and expertise likewise become
increasingly significant resources (Lövbrand forthcoming, Lidskog
and Sundqvist 2011). The growing demand for policy-relevant
knowledge has led to, or at least supported the growth of, a novel
group of global expert organizations.1 Their defining characteris -
tic is that they are entrusted with the task of reviewing and asses -
sing the most recent scientific information produced worldwide
that is relevant to an understanding of environmental change in
relation to policy-relevant problems. This expertise, referred to as
an assessment, can be seen as a form of second-order knowledge
production. It is complementary to forms of first-order knowledge
production in traditional science because such assessments ar-
ticulate the highly distributed and disaggregated assortment of
rel evant scientific research and publications. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and
the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services(IPBES)provide excellent examples through which to ex -
plore the choices and options available when it comes to the gov-
ernance of global expertise. The IPCC has just published its Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5)2. The panel is recognized as a pio neer
in providing policy-relevant science to global policy: It has con -
ducted the most comprehensive orchestration of scientific knowl-
edge to date and has managed to include experts from around the
world in policy advice activities. In doing so it has spoken on be-
half of global science with one voice, thereby acquiring a reputa -
tion as the epistemic authority in matters of climate policy. It was
jointly awarded the 2007Nobel Peace Prize along with former US
Vice President Al Gore. The 2007 IPCC assessment report had
al ready signaled that controversies over the existence of global
warming have effectively been settled and that human influenc -
es on the climate system are real and significant (IPCC 2007).The
IPCC has thus accomplished a core part of its original mission,
namely to provide sound scientific evidence about the causes of
human-in duced global climate change. However, many of the
characteristics and consequences of future climate change at
sub-global scales, as well as their interactions with other drivers
of change in the world, are still poorly understood. Because much
has changed since the establishment of the IPCC in the late 1980s,
discussions about the panel’s future beyond 2014 are back on the
agenda of the IPCC plenary sessions (Stocker 2013). 
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Due to its achievements it has also been referred to in many
spheres – including biodiversity and food security – as a model
for organizing expert committees (Loreau et al. 2006). One exam -
ple is the recently founded IPBES. Its establishment was preced-
ed by negotiations over its institutional design, which went on for
several years. The platform was set up in 2012 as a permanent in -
tergovernmental science-policy organization in order to build up -
on and further the work of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MEA 2005). Its second plenary session (IPBES-2) held in Antal -
ya, Turkey, in December 2013, adopted the Antalya Consensus
which notably contains the initial – ambitious – work program
for the period 2014 to 2018. 
In the following we discuss the responsiveness and organiza -
tional reflexivity of both panels. In the first part of this commen-
tary, we explore the case of the IPCC. The second part focuses on
the IPBES. The IPCC and the IPBES are at different stages in their
development, and they differ in their mandate, scope and politi -
cal contexts. Notwithstanding these differences, both face com-
parable challenges situated at the interface between science, pub-
lic policy and global publics.3 In this commentary we briefly il -
lustrate how the IPCC and IPBES have responded to particular
challenges such as to demands for political relevance, the integra-
tion and representation of diverse and distributed knowledge and
calls for public accountability and participation. We take these three
challenges as a thematic direction for the discussion that follows.
This enables us to highlight similarities and differences as well
as points of convergence and divergence between them, leading
to a consideration of path dependency and avenues for potential
mutual learning processes between the IPCC and IPBES. 
We also elaborate on the choices, room for maneuver and op-
tions that are available when designing or reforming global ex-
pert organizations. Indeed, the fact of this being a “choice” at all
is often exactly the point at issue. The value lies more in opening
up appreciations of choice than in closing these down (Stirling
2010). These choices concern the criteria for, inter alia, evaluating
scientific evidence, setting standards for knowledge validity, se-
lecting experts, organizing review procedures, and demarcating
mandates between scientific and political institutions (Jasanoff
2012). The reflexive turn differs from prevailing approaches to the
institutional design of expert organizations in two constitutive
features. First, it calls attention to their epistemological and nor-
mative frameworks and thus, second, it opens up a space to consid -
er and evaluate the full range of alternative institutional design
options as opposed to implementing a one-size-fits-all model of
expertise. The normative criteria underpinning our own approach
derive from debates in science and technology studies (STS) con-
cerning the democratic accountability of science policy. Taking
our lead from this tradition, key is to import notions of delegation,
accountability, and representation into the analysis and negoti-
ation of expert decision-making (Jasanoff 2012, Miller 2009, Stir-
ling 2010, Wynne 2007).
IPCC: Closing Down to Process and 
Procedures
Scientific assessment bodies are now established as a significant
part of global environmental governance and exercise a remark-
able amount of epistemic and political authority. The joint award
of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC is evidence of this. The
way global expert organizations frame environmental problems
determines what exactly the “problem” is that needs to be assessed
and “resolved”. Therefore, then, we also pay attention to process -
es of framing and re-framing issues, given that these processes
in turn serve to shape and constrain the potential solutions. For
example, in the case of the IPCC, “global average temperature”
has long been the organizing device around which both scientif -
ic knowledge has been assessed and different policy options eval-
uated. Framing global climate change as a universal risk that de-
mands collective action serves to underscore the need for consen -
sus-based knowledge production and decision support. It has been
difficult, if not impossible, for the IPCC to break away from the
early framing of climate change around global average tempera -
ture as the pre-eminent indicator of risk.4
As a result, the political discussions about climate change –
along with popular perceptions of “global warming” – have be-
come unnecessarily selective and restrictive. The range of policy
choices that are compatible with the current range of scientific
findings is narrowed down to improving climate predictions and
creating new economic policy instruments (Reisinger 2011), thus
neglecting a large number of policy alternatives including adap-
tation (Prins et al. 2010). This has been shown to be problematic
in the international political sphere. 
The IPCC has also largely failed to engage with alternative
forms of expertise such as local knowledge (Ford et al. 2012), or
to evaluate and facilitate more radical forms of civic action (e.g.,
Jamison 2010). This has closed off some forms of political re-
sponse, with some arguing that climate change has become a
“post-political” technocratic issue which limits opportunities for
democratic debate (Machin 2013). 
3 Boundary organizations are characterized by the fact that they are able to
take on both academic as well as policy-related tasks. Given multiple forms
of accountability and participation, they face the challenge of taking into 
account the heterogeneous expectations of their different audiences: 
They have to reconcile political demands, such as for geopolitical 
representativeness and public accountability, with the need for expert 
decision-making and integrity. 
4 Now that the existence and primary cause of climate change are essentially
settled, IPCC working groups II and III are moving beyond a monolithic 
approach: They are facing a larger number of second-tier questions – for 
example, regarding the manifestation of climate change in extreme events,
in the availability of water and food and on regional scales, as well as the
ever-elusive effect of aerosols on climate. WG II has produced a summary 
of its recent work, which has also helped to place climate change impacts 
in relation to other drivers/pressures, thereby adding an important 
component to the discussion. 
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Much has changed since the late 1980s when the IPCC was
established. Starting out with relatively few formalized rules in
1988, the IPCC has gone through three major revisions, in 1993,
1999, and 2010.5 As a response to the controversial release of cli-
mate scientists’ e-mails (the “climategate” affair) and arguments
about errors in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007),
the alliance of national scientific academies – the InterAcade-
my Council (IAC) – was commissioned in March 2010 to conduct
an independent evaluation of the procedures and processes of the
IPCC.6 The IAC focused on processes of assessment and qual-
ity assurance rather than on the content and quality of IPCC re-
ports. The events surrounding “climategate” raised important
questions about the process of knowledge production rather than
seriously challenging the core substance of that knowledge (Hul -
me 2010). These events showed that in terms of public value it
is the social practices and quality of knowledge making that mat-
ter as much as the content of the knowledge itself. The council
acknowledged that the IPCC therefore has a growing obligation
to account for its workings and conclusions, not least because the
panel is highly exposed to public scrutiny and ef fectively operat -
ing “under the public microscope”(IAC 2010).Experts have to be
responsive to the ways in which scientific knowledge is validated
and made authoritative for public use. The IAC also emphasized
that in its present form the panel was no longer able to cope ade -
quately with the challenges it faces (IAC 2010, p. 6). 
The negotiations over IPCC reform have thus far focused on
improving scientific quality by reviewing specific procedures
(from the selection of authors and review procedures to the way
errors are dealt with in published assessment reports). The issue
of public trust is treated as one of effective communication. This
attempt at reforming the IPCC has amounted to making existing
procedures more transparent for the scientists and nation state
representatives already involved.7 However, it also means that
the panel’s work continues to take place “behind closed doors”. 
Although a perceived lack of public accountability can be re-
garded as one of the triggers of public controversy following “cli-
mategate”, there has been no evidence to date of any efforts to es-
tablish appropriate mechanisms of disclosure to address it. This
narrowing of the outcomes of reform negotiations has been close -
ly associated with the panel’s consensus-based decision-making
procedures. Whenever matters of negotiation have been contest-
ed, consensus-based negotiations have led to a “lowest common
denominator” – a minimum outcome accepted by all parties at
that time (Rahmstorf 2013). The requirement of unanimity and
the orchestration of procedures, however (so runs the argument),
leads to the fact that scientific findings and views deviating from
the mainstream are systematically ignored or excluded (PBL 2010).
It is precisely those reform proposals that go beyond incremen-
tal revision of specific procedures and signal a need for structur -
al adaptation, which remain highly contentious and have there-
fore largely been bracketed out of the intergovernmental negoti -
ations, or else postponed. So far, no debate has ever taken place
about the IPCC’s relationship to public policy and to its various
global “publics” or about its normative commitments in terms
of accountability, political representation, and legitimacy. 
We argue, however, that “business as usual” and incremental
adjustments of the procedures and institutional design are not
enough to adequately address novel challenges (IAC 2010). As a
result, the IPCC reforms address not so much the causes (such as
the perceived lack of public accountability) as merely the symp-
toms (e. g., the lack of transparency of existing procedures) of the
problem. 
These difficulties also point to the more profound problem of
how climate change issues are framed. The framing of climate
change by the IPCC as a universal global risk reinforces the as-
sumption that more and better consensual decision support will
lead to public trust and political action. This assumption is not
necessarily the solution, but might contribute to the problem of
political inertia. Our point is that the IPCC has bought into a very
specific framing of “the problem” that has rendered climate poli -
cy ineffective and has foreclosed the possibility of public consent.
If climate change risks were framed differently, then different
forms of political action would open up – in relation, for exam-
ple, to regional adaptation, local air quality, and energy services
for the poor. Opening up the issue of climate change to different
ways of framing is part of an enhanced reflexivity and social learn-
ing process. To overcome this situation, we suggest that the pan-
el needs to continuously review its own procedures, performance,
and underlying assumptions. 
The question then is how the panel best can navigate the diffi -
cult matter of representation. Is it to be a closed conversation be-
tween (accredited) experts and policy-makers? Or do the views of
the public matter? It is these choices and normative criteria them-
selves that, once chosen, must be made explicit and subject to reg-
ular deliberation and re-appraisal.  
Political relevance: When the IPCC was formed in 1988, it fitted
neatly into the UN’s multilateral order based on national repre-
sentation and the search for internationally negotiated solutions.
At a time, however, when UN climate multilateralism has lost
momentum, the panel now faces the challenge of adjusting to a
changing geo-political architecture characterized by a more frag-
mented, polycentric order in which (climate) governance occurs
at more than simply the level of nation states (Ostrom 2010). Giv-
en these novel constellations the IPCC reform debate cannot re-
late only to procedures and management structures to improve
the transparency of its processes. It has to also address its broad-
er institutional settings such as the post-Kyoto architecture where
policy needs to engage diverse citizens with multiple beliefs, val-
ues, and sources of knowledge (Hulme 2014). To maintain its
policy relevance, the panel should respond to the changing infor -
mation needs of its primary audience, such as national govern-
ments, and recognize the diverse knowledge needs from a much
doi: 10.14512/gaia.23.2.4  | GAIA 23/2(2014): 80–87
5 www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_procedures.shtml#.UQ J7ZXfjEXQ
6 http://reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net
7 www.iisd.ca/climate/ipcc34
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broader group of stakeholders. We contend also that it may not
be practicable for one expert panel under sole ownership – that
of the world’s governments, but operating under the delegated
management of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) – to
deliver an exhaustive, fully integrated, universally credible assess -
ment of all relevant climate-change knowledge. The issues fac-
ing the world today are probably not going to be resolved by pro-
ducing yet more mega-global assessments – perhaps it is a larger
number of distributed assessments that we need.
Forms of integration and representation: Framing anthropogenic
climate change as a global universal risk calls for particular sci-
entific practices of up-scaling and a standardization of approach-
es (Miller 2004).8 Continuing the quest for increasingly integrat-
ed and consensus-based decision support information may not
be the most beneficial way to inform debates about diverse poli -
cy portfolios in politically contested fields such as energy supply
and carbon dioxide removal. Here, cultural differences and pref-
erences proliferate, and significant decisions can be taken at much
smaller scales than the planet. Focusing on consensus, the IPCC
becomes vulnerable to criticism relating to issues where no con-
sensus exists (e.g., biofuels, solar radiation management technol -
ogies). The IPCC’s emphasis on peer reviewed research to under -
pin its univocal, consensus-based statements has simultaneously
excluded alternative forms of expertise – such as legal reports,
which, as a rule, are rarely published in these forums – along with
more localized and informal forms of knowledge.9 As a response
to these shortcomings, the IPCC has introduced new guidelines
for the integration of “gray literature” into AR5 (WG I TSU 2010).
Integrating, or even aligning, these new areas of knowledge in fu-
ture assessments may require different procedures – such as ex-
tended quality control, expert elicitations, and minority reporting
– and different institutional arrangements. Different protocols
for expert deliberation across different knowledge domains may
be needed as well as greater public transparency about how these
protocols work in practice. This is one reason why the IPCC has
to be “prized open” and re-constituted to reflect the changing po-
litical, social, and cultural worlds in which climate change now cir-
culates. 
Public accountability and participation: The events surrounding
“climategate” demonstrated that public trust cannot be reduced
to a function of the quality of science or the breadth and depth
of consensus on science alone, as the IPCC had assumed. They
showed that trust in science is related to the performance and per-
suasive power of the people and institutions who speak for sci-
ence – and that not all countries interpret or trust the IPCC in
similar ways (Hajer 2012). The IPCC’s chosen style of risk assess -
ment and communication has also contributed to a unitary ap-
proach to representing scientific consensus as a single voice.Not
acknowledging or inviting diverse voices to speak will fail to as-
suage the sense of mistrust. In response, the IPCC plenary has
not yet adopted a process of full public disclosure, and it contin -
ues to rely upon its existing knowledge-making processes mediat -
ed by national delegations. In addition, current discussions about
the future of the IPCC continue to be conducted largely behind
closed doors, even if the formal positions of countries are some-
what more transparent. It is very likely that in the future the pan-
el will be exposed to scrutiny from more diverse and lively publics
and that it will have to respond to forms of distributed or uninvit-
ed public participation (Wynne 2007).
Many of the issues we raise are empirically open questions, but
it is fair to assume that the IPCC’s future performance will de-
pend on how thoroughly it responds to these sorts of challenges. 
IPBES: Opening Up to Alternatives
Prominent voices in the science and policy community have as-
serted that, in order to tackle the biodiversity crisis, the discon-
nect between science and policy needs to be overcome by estab-
lishing a permanent, globally orchestrated organization akin to
the IPCC (DIVERSITAS 2005, Loreau et al. 2006). However, these
calls for an “IPCC for biodiversity” have been contested from the
start (Görg et al. 2007, Hulme et al. 2011, Perrings et al. 2011, Turn -
hout et al. 2012). After seven years of intense negotiations the
IPBES was formally established in 2012 under the auspices of
UNEP (Spierenburg 2012). Instead of simply implementing the
IPCC design and procedures, IPBES negotiations explored differ -
ent options concerning the governance structure of the platform.
Overall, the negotiation processes over how to set up the IPBES
have been relatively transparent and open.They have involved a
broad range of stakeholders and have favored a multidisciplin -
ary expert approach from the beginning. As a result, the scope of
these negotiations has been relatively broad and inclusive: for
instance, the IPBES agenda has not been restricted to procedures
and management structures, as was the case with the IPCC re-
form agenda, but has included a thorough gap analysis of infor-
mation needs and the explicit involvement of stakeholders (Koetz
et al. 2012). It was enlarged to address the same three challenges
as those facing the IPCC: 
Political relevance: The IPBES has spent a lot of time and effort
aligning itself with a complex governance structure that includes
several global agreements and takes account of the need to address
the specific regional and local conditions of biodiversity and eco -
system services loss. It also had to identify the knowledge needs >
8 This emerges from an idealized model of policy-making based on neutral
scientific advice feeding into political decision-making. The IPCC’s decision
to present scientific assessments as based on consensus rests upon the
assump tion that univocal scientific statements are more authoritative in
transnational politics than multi-vocal statements.
9 Scientometric studies, for instance, show that references to IPCC reports
are skewed towards geophysical sciences and countries of the global North
(Vasileiadou et al. 2011).
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and gaps to be addressed by this novel expert platform. During
the scoping process it was recognized that producing yet anoth-
er comprehensive and global assessment report on the state of
biodiversity and ecosystem services science, based on the Millen -
nium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005), will not meet the needs of
its diverse audiences and will fail to support localized action on
the ground. In order to enhance its political relevance, the IPBES
decided to produce a global but multi-scale assessment and to
complement this process by setting up three additional working
areas, namely knowledge generation, capacity building, and pol-
icy support. 
Forms of integration and representation: In contrast to the IPCC,
the IPBES accords greater value to regional and local scales. This
refers not only to the scale of assessments but also to the inclu-
sion of local and indigenous knowledge, building on the strong
voice and involvement of the according stakeholder groups in
global deliberations, especially on the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD). Thus, instead of taking scientific, peer-reviewed
knowledge as the gold standard, the IPBES plenary discussed the
relevance and credibility of different forms and sources of knowl-
edge and experience in relation to serving the broad range of tasks
the IPBES decided to tackle. As a result, the IPBES agreed on es-
tablishing a task force for strengthening the quality of indigenous
peoples’ participation in the platform’s deliverables. It has also
recognized that an exclusive focus on economic valuation is not
an adequate response to the complexity of biodiversity loss. It has
taken on board a differentiated conceptualization of the values of
biodiversity and of its benefits for human well-being. While these
commitments signify a willingness to take the value of diverse
knowledge systems seriously, the challenge remains how to cope
with diversity in practice. 
The IPBES has agreed on a con ceptual framework that acknowl-
edges the multiplicity of knowledge systems. What is essential-
ly at stake is whether the IPBES can employ mechanisms of stan-
dardization and commensuration while at the same time retain-
ing uncertainties, divergent world views, and relevant local and
indigenous knowledge (Turnhout et al. 2012).What it seeks to ac -
 complish is to produce a diverse range of possible interventions
and policy options using this framework. 
Public accountability and participation: The IPBES has its origins
in a multi-stakeholder initiative. At the same time, it was estab-
lished as an intergovernmental platform. Much like the IPCC,
governments participate in the plenary sessions (see figure),
where decisions about the work program, rules and procedures
are made and reports are accepted, adopted and approved. In con-
trast to the IPCC, in the case of the IPBES many stakeholders
asked to be recognized as equal partners in all important aspects
of the work of the IPBES, including the nomination of experts
(Ca rino 2013). These requests imply an expansion of stakehold-
ers’ rights and their legal status. They are moving far beyond the
observer role usually granted to non-governmental organizations
in intergovernmental settings under the UN. However, national
governments with decision-making authority in the IPBES plena -
ry are reluctant to adopt a stakeholder engagement strategy that
implies enhancing the role of stakeholders through their partici -
pation in all IPBES processes (Opgenoorth et al. 2014). 
The IPBES still struggles to implement innovative options to meet
the demands of scientists, politicians, and diverse global publics;
thus resembling other approaches to improve the science-policy
interface on the topic biodiversity (Spierenburg 2012, Neßhöver
et al. 2013). It remains an open question whether and how these
demands will be incorporated into the rules and procedures of the
IPBES. Notwithstanding the acknowledgement of different types
of knowledge and the need for broad stakeholder involvement,
the negotiations on how to set up a stakeholder engagement strat-
egy are not yet completed and the role and legal status of stake-
holders has not yet been established (Opgenoorth et al. 2014). Up -
coming negotiations will determine whether or not the IPBES is
capable of engaging with issues of plural knowledge systems,
local voices, and diverse forms of public engagement. 
The institutional setting of the UN system does not favor open-
ness to alternative design options. Often, IPBES negotiations turn
into bargaining processes about the allocation of power and au-
thority. Key players then realize that they may gain (or lose) epis-
temic and political authority as a result of being reconfigured
around this new platform. As a consequence, IPBES negotiations
reveal a feature that also characterizes IPCC negotiations inside
the plenary (Beck 2012). Even if governments are willing to dele -
gate authority to global expert organizations, they still try to safe-
guard their influence by controlling processes such as the nom-
ination of experts or the drafting of summaries for policy makers.
By restricting the diversity of voices and closing down the range
of options open to negotiation, consensus-based knowledge as-
sessment procedures constrain the room for maneuver and lim-
it innovation. They reinforce incremental change as the default
mode of evolution, rather than encouraging more dynamic forms
of organizational learning. 
Conclusions
The examples of the IPCC and the IPBES indicate that there is a
need and an opportunity to reflect on the very purpose and under -
lying rationale of global expert organizations. The IPCC has been
hegemonic – as the persistent rhetoric surrounding the IPBES
has shown (such as the calls for “an IPCC for biodiversity”) (Lor -
eau et al. 2006). However, there is no such thing as a one-size-
fits-all model for the governance of expertise. The argument we
have made is twofold: first, as the IPCC experience shows, assess-
ment panels must themselves change over time, sometimes rad-
ically; and second, those involved in each new domain for which
an expert assessment body is convened must do the job of insti -
tutional design mostly from scratch – different assessment pro -
cesses should be designed accordingly to address context-specif -
ic demands for knowledge(s). 
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Even if we cannot provide substantive recommendations for
particular cases, we can nonetheless highlight a number of gener -
ic procedural design principles. An overly narrow focus on chang-
ing procedures and management structures – as has been adopt-
ed by the IPCC following the IAC review – is not sufficient to the
tasks and challenges these organizations will face in the future.
Instead, a more ready and open acknowledgment of such organi -
za tions’ normative commitments and alternative institutional de -
sign options may help to render expertise more responsive and
effective. The reflexive turn implies an opening up of perceptual
horizons to recognize different models of “ownership” (state/
non-state/UN) and to legitimize multiple knowledges and diverse
standards of evaluation. This kind of active “opening up” of polit -
ical space and a “pluralist” approach to knowledge offer a more
robust basis for the governance of expertise. 
Of course, the move towards reflexive expertise is not new. Nei -
ther can it solve all difficulties nor can it automatically guarantee
better results.Constraints will remain in terms of available capac -
ity to address emerging tasks, trade-offs between conflicting aims
(e.g., between demands for broad participation and for scientific
integrity), and political expectations that may constrict the selec -
tion and implementation of institutional design options. Howev -
er, throughout all processes of negotiation and review it is crucial
to confront the reality of uncertainties, political antagonisms, and
power struggles in order to render them open to change, rather
than simply ignoring them. To do justice to the issues we raise
above it is necessary to challenge the underlying assumptions –
such as the ideal of neutral scientific advice – and institutional dy-
namics – such as intergovernmental status and consensus-based
procedures – that drive such organizations toward premature clo-
sure or even organizational paralysis. The IPBES is a promising
example of what may be achieved in terms of openness; yet its
institutional design (e.g., issues of accountability towards observ -
ers such as scientific organizations) and its procedures (e.g., stake-
holder participation in knowledge assessments) have not yet been
fully adopted and its workings will need continuous monitoring
and organizational review (Turnhout et al. 2012, Opgenoorth et
al. 2014).10
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10 In order to fully assess the organizational reflexivity and adaptability, one
has to take into account that both organizations differ when it comes to
the degree of the institutionalization of their governance structures. While
procedures and the final governance structures of the IPBES are still under
negotiation, the IPCC has evolved from a small informal network of experts
to a large intergovernmental organization, which has established a compli-
cated set of formalized rules of procedures. The strategy of formalizing
procedures contributes towards a greater coherence of governance struc-
tures and therefore increases the political robustness of the organization.
The increasing standardization, however, contributes to reinforcing 
bureaucracy and the inertia. It is still open how the IPBES governance
structure may differ from the IPCC arrangement when it is finally set up.
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This reflexive turn aims to generate a broad range of visions,
pathways, and ways of responding that leave room for choice. For
this reason we encourage experimentation with new forms and
formats of governing expertise by bringing in largely neglected
sources of knowledge, voices and options. The more perspectives
are available to political actors, the wider the range of policy op-
tions that will be conceivable. A more reflexive and inclusive form
of governing environmental expertise, based upon a more plural
and participatory normative and epistemic framework, can make
knowledge about environmental change more useful and increase
politicians’ and the general public’s willingness to adopt new pol -
icies. Recognizing competing ways of seeing and knowing nature
and society may contribute not only towards mapping out possi -
ble future trajectories of environmental change but also towards
investigating a wider set of policy choices and constructing alter -
native framings and visions for society in the future. 
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